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Abstract We extend the Areeda–Turner rule to two-sided markets. We show that
a two-sided monopolist may find it short-run profit-maximizing to charge a price
below marginal cost on one side of the market. Hence showing that the price is
below marginal cost on one side of a two-sided market cannot be considered a sign
of predation. We then argue for a two-sided Areeda–Turner rule that takes into
account price-cost margins on both sides of the market. Two examples highlight that
applying a one-sided Areeda–Turner rule may lead one to assess legitimate prices as
predatory or to consider predatory prices as legitimate.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we extend the Areeda–Turner rule to two-sided markets. We do so by
following the original logic of Areeda and Turner (1975). In their seminal article,
the authors set out to identify a rational dividing line between legitimately
competitive prices and prices that should be regarded as predatory. Adopting the
classical definition of predation as the deliberate sacrifice of present revenues for the
purpose of driving rivals out of the market and then recouping the losses, they
proposed that ‘‘[u]nless at or above average cost, a price below reasonably
anticipated (1) shortrun marginal costs or (2) average variable costs should be
deemed predatory, and the monopolist may not defend on the grounds that his price
was ‘promotional’ or merely met an equally low price of a competitor’’. In addition
‘‘[r]ecognizing that marginal cost data are typically unavailable’’ they concluded
that ‘‘[a] price below reasonably anticipated average variable cost should be
conclusively presumed unlawful’’.1
Following the original logic of Areeda and Turner (1975), we seek a threshold for
the price, such that a price below this threshold should be deemed predatory. We
argue that such a threshold needs to take into account the specificity of two-sided
markets. In these markets firms act as platforms and sell two different products or
services to two distinct groups of customers.2 An example is the newspaper market,
in which publishers sell content to readers and advertising slots to advertisers.
A two-sided market is further characterised by indirect network externalities
between the two groups of users. These arise when the utility (or the profits)
obtained by a customer (whether a final consumer or a firm) of one group depends
on the number of customers of the other group and the two groups of customers do
not internalise these externalities.3
In the case of newspapers, advertisers place a greater value on advertising in a
given newspaper the more readers the newspaper has. Readers may or may not be
affected by the amount of advertising in the newspaper,4 but for the market to be
two-sided already the presence of one indirect network effect is sufficient.5
Whereas customers do not internalize the externality (or externalities) above,
two-sided platforms do internalize it (them) when deciding their optimal pricing
1 Areeda and Turner (1975, p. 733).
2 See Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003, 2006), Evans (2003), Parker and
Alstyne (2005) and Armstrong (2006).
3 As a result, a two-sided platform is different from a firm that sells complementary products. Indeed in
the latter case there is only one group of customers who typically buy both goods (e.g. the ink-jet printer
and the ink-jet cartridge) and thus, unless they are naive, they respond to changes in the prices of both. In
a newspaper market, instead, a reader does not care about the price charged to advertisers and vice versa
advertisers do not decide whether to place an ad in a newspaper based on the cover price of the latter.
4 Empirical evidence so far seems to suggest that on average readers of daily newspapers are either
indifferent to or slightly like advertising (which is usually not targeted but avoidable). See Argentesi and
Filistrucchi (2007), Fan (2013) and Filistrucchi et al. (2012). Readers of magazines seem instead to attach
a positive value to advertising (which is avoidable and more targeted). See Kaiser and Wright (2006) and
Kaiser and Song (2009).
5 See Filistrucchi et al. (2013).
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strategies. As a result, the profit-maximizing prices by two-sided platforms may be
very different from those charged by firms in one-sided markets.
As pointed out by Rochet and Tirole (2006), in a two-sided market, where two
products or services are sold to two groups of customers, one can distinguish the
price level from the price structure. The price level is the sum of the two prices,
while the price structure is the ratio of the two prices. When the unit of measurement
of the goods or services sold on the two-sides are different and the matching of
customers on the two sides is not one to one, the price level is not simply the sum of
the two prices, but rather the sum of the two prices expressed in the same unit of
measurement.
In the case of newspapers the price level is the sum of the cover price and the per-
copy advertising revenues.6 Similarly, the price structure is the ratio of the two.7 In
two-sided markets not only the price level but also the price structure determines
firms’ profits. For instance, the profits of a publisher not only depend on how much
revenues per copy of the newspaper it can raise but also on what percentage of
revenues comes from readers versus advertisers: For a given revenue per copy, a
business strategy that charges only readers may not be as profitable as one that
charges only advertisers. Indeed, we observe free newspapers more often than we
observe no-advertising newspapers.
The difference in pricing strategies that characterizes two-sided markets warrants
in many instances a different antitrust treatment. A recent review discussing these
issues is Evans and Schmalensee (2015).
Parker and Alstyne (2005) were among the first to present an economic model
that highlights that in two-sided markets pricing below marginal cost on one side
may be a (nonstrategic) profit-maximising strategy. Indeed, by pricing below
marginal cost on one side of the market a firm increases sales on that side, thus
boosting demand and profits on the other side. Wright (2004) included the claim that
‘‘price below marginal cost on one side of the market is a sign of predation’’ among
the eight fallacies that derive from applying a one-sided logic to two-sided markets.8
Despite the warnings of the economics literature, competition authorities and
courts tend to analyse predatory claims with a one-sided logic. In the recent case
Bottin Cartographes versus Google,9 for instance, the Commercial Court of Paris
6 One can also express the price level in terms of advertising pages. In that case it is the sum of the
advertising price and the circulation revenues per-advertising-page.
7 Note that such a ratio is equivalent to the ratio between the revenues from the two sides. In the
newspapers’ business the ratio of circulation revenues to advertising revenues (or vice versa) is
sometimes called the ‘financing mix’.
8 To our knowledge, no paper discusses the conditions for predation in prices to take place in a two-sided
market. A partial exception is Motta and Vasconcelos (2012) who present a model of platform
competition in which below-cost pricing can be used to deter the entry of a more efficient rival. However,
the result in Motta and Vasconcelos (2012) crucially depends on the fact that one of the two firms is
already present in the market, while the other is trying to enter.
9 Bottin Cartographes v. Google Inc. and Google France Srl, Commercial Court of Paris, 15th chamber,
31 January 2012, available at http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=
3327. In July 2009 Bottin Cartographes SAS (hereafter ‘Bottin’) filed a lawsuit before the Commercial
Court of Paris (Paris Tribunal de Commerce) against Google Inc. and Google France Srl (hereinafter
collectively ‘Google’) for alleged abuse of a dominant position in the market of online mapping services
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found Google guilty of the abuse of a dominant position in the market for online
maps that allow stores’ geolocation.10 The Court reached its decision by simply
considering that the price of Google Maps API, being equal to 0 €, was necessarily
lower than the production costs of the service. Interestingly, the Court stopped just
short of recognizing the implications for competition policy of the two-sided
business strategy of Google, as it recognized that Google, according to the contracts,
would be able to insert advertising in its Google Maps API service and therefore sell
targeted advertising.
Judgements such as the one above may partly be due to the fact that most policy
contributions so far, such as Wright (2004), have criticized the application of the
one-sided Areeda–Turner rule to two-sided markets without suggesting an
alternative. Even those policy contributions, such as Fletcher (2007) or Evans and
Noel (2008), that recognized the necessity to provide guidance to practitioners fall
short of providing new applicable methods. In fact, when Google appealed the
decision of the Commercial Court of Paris, the Court of Appeal of Paris11 decided to
suspend the proceeding and ask the French Competition Authority to deliver an
opinion on whether Google’s conduct had to be considered anticompetitive.12 The
request of the Court of Appeal highlights the uncertainty among practitioners with
regard to criteria to establish predatory pricing in two-sided markets.
We contribute to filling this gap by explaining how one should modify the
Areeda–Turner rule to account for the two-sidedness of a market. Testing for
predatory pricing in a two-sided market must take into account the presence of the
indirect network effects between the two sides. Hence, it has to recognize that price-
cost margins on the two sides of the market are interrelated. We thus show that one
needs to compare the overall price level with the joint marginal cost of the two-sides
of the market. Since, as already noted by Areeda and Turner (1975), marginal cost
data are difficult to obtain, one should compare the overall price level with the
overall average variable cost.
Footnote 9 continued
that provide stores’ geolocation on firms’ websites. Bottin is a multimedia mapping company that pro-
vides, among other things, online map applications that allow users to locate addresses and create
itineraries online, which compete in France with the equivalent service of Google Maps API (Application
Programming Interface). While Bottin offers its service in exchange for an annual fee and an ex post
compensation based on actual consumption, the ordinary version of Google Maps API is provided to its
customers on a free basis. Bottin claimed that this had to be considered a predatory pricing and that by
doing so Google aimed to extend its dominant position in the market of online search to the connected
relevant market.
10 More precisely, with its decision of 31 January 2012 the Commercial Court of Paris found Google
guilty of the abuse of a dominant position pursuant to Article L-420-2 paragraph 1 of the French
Commercial Code and, as a consequence, awarded Bottin 500,000 € damages and interests, in addition to
ordering Google to publish the judgment at its expense in several French and international newspapers.
11 Bottin Cartographes v. Google France and Google Inc. Court of Appeal of Paris, 5th Pole, 5th
Chamber, 20 November 2013, available on http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-
decision&id_article=3942.
12 The opinion of the Competition Authority has not been made public yet. In fact, it can be disclosed
only after the ruling of the Appeal Court (art. L.462-3 of the French Code of Commerce), which has not
been handed out yet.
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Filistrucchi et al. (2013) point out that there exist two-types of two-sided
markets. Two-sided non-transaction markets are characterized by the absence of a
transaction between the two sides of the market and, even though an interaction is
present, it is usually not observable, so that a per-transaction (or per-interaction) fee
or a two-part tariff is not possible. Typical examples are media markets. Two-sided
transaction markets are instead characterized by the presence and observability of a
transaction between the two groups of platform users. As a result, the platform is
able to charge not only a price for joining the platform, but also one for using it, i.e.
it can ask a two-part tariff. Examples in this category include payment cards
schemes, virtual marketplaces, auction houses and operating systems.
The extension of the Areeda–Turner rule that we develop is in line with the
suggestion by Evans (2003) for transaction markets.13 This suggestion was however
not derived from a formal model. In addition, Evans (2003) recognized the difficulty
in providing guidance as to how to implement the test in two-sided non-transaction
markets. Our formulas, which are derived from the application of the same logic as
Areeda and Turner (1975), are applicable instead to two-sided non-transaction
markets, such as the market for newspapers that we consider in Sect. 3. However,
following the same approach also for two-sided transaction markets, one would
indeed obtain similar formulas to those proposed by Evans (2003).
Discussing predatory pricing in two-sided transaction markets, Fletcher (2007)
suggested that a predatory pricing rule should be drawn from the finding in Rochet
and Tirole (2006) that the markup on each side of a two-sided market can be
calculated as in a one-sided market, with the caveat that from the marginal cost one
needs to subtract any extra revenue that the extra sales on that side of the market
generate on the other side of the market. It turns out that the latter intuition is, to
some extent, true also for two-sided non-transaction markets. By deriving our
conditions from a formal model, we explain what this extra term is in a two-sided
non-transaction market and highlight that one also needs to take into account the
extra cost incurred on the other side of the market.
We then apply our two-sided Areeda–Turner rule to two cases in the newspaper
industry. We first look at the price war in the UK quality daily newspapers in the
’90s and test whether the pricing strategy of The Times from September 1993 to
December 1995 was an example of predatory pricing, as claimed by its competitors,
particularly by the Independent. The case was investigated by the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) which concluded against the existence of predatory behaviour.
The case enjoyed considerable publicity at the time for its political implications
and has not ceased to be debated, not only because the OFT decision, whether right
or wrong, did not include much empirical investigation but also because, looking at
it today in light of the theory of two-sided markets, it is striking that the OFT did not
carry out any analysis of the advertising market. We show that, had it done so, it
would have found that the pricing strategy of the Times was probably not predatory,
even taking for granted the cost estimates of The Independent, according to which
the Times was sold to readers at a price below average variable cost.
13 Evans (2003) calls them ‘matchmaking’ two-sided markets.
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We then discuss the case of Aberdeen Journals, whose pricing strategies between
1996 and 2000 were also investigated by the OFT. It was a case of alleged predation
that involved free newspapers in Scotland. The OFT and the Competition Appeal
Tribunal (CAT) calculated price-cost margins and concluded that the advertising
prices that were set by Aberdeen Journals in response to the entry of Aberdeen &
District Independent were below average variable costs and, therefore, predatory.
We argue that, although readers did not pay for the newspapers, the OFT took the
right approach in taking into account also the costs incurred on the readers side.
The paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 compares monopoly pricing in two-
sided markets to monopoly pricing in one-sided markets and extends the one-sided
Areeda–Turner rule to two-sided markets. In Sect. 3 we analyse the two cases of
alleged predatory behaviour in the market for daily newspapers, namely the Times
versus Independent war and the Aberdeen Journals case. Section 4 concludes.
2 Areeda–Turner from One to Two Sides
2.1 One-Sided Versus Two-Sided Monopoly Pricing
We here show the difference between monopoly pricing in one-sided and two-sided
markets.








where CðÞ is the monopolist’s cost function and gQP is the elasticity of market
demand Q with respect to the price P.
This formula reminds us that a short-run profit-maximizing monopolist in a one-
sided market will set a price above marginal cost.
A monopolist in a two-sided market sets PA on side A of the market and PR on
side R of the market14 so as to maximize overall profits
p ¼ PAQA þ PRQR  CðQA;QRÞ ð2Þ
subject to the constraints
QR ¼ QRðPR;QAÞ
QA ¼ QAðPA;QRÞ ð3Þ
where the demands QRðÞ and QAðÞ are functions of prices on the same market side
and of quantities on the other side of the market.
14 Our empirical examples below are for the daily newspaper market. Hence, we denote the two sides of
the market with A (for advertisers) and R (for readers).
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In two-sided markets, quantities on one market side are functions of prices on
that market side and quantities on the other market side. In the context of the
newspaper industry, this means that the amount of advertising demanded is a
function of the advertising price and the number of readers, while the number of
readers is a function of the cover price and the quantity of advertising.











i.e. if the product of the indirect network effects is not too large,15 the users’
coordination game, identified by Armstrong (2006) and further discussed by Weyl
(2010), has a unique solution and the set of constraints can be rewritten as
QR ¼ Q^RðPR;PAÞ
QA ¼ Q^AðPA;PRÞ ð5Þ
where the demands Q^RðÞ and Q^AðÞ are now functions of prices on both market
sides only.
In other words, if the condition above holds, although customers do not
internalize the link between demands, there exist reduced form demands which
depend on prices on the two sides of the market. In the context of the newspaper
market, it implies that it is possible to express both advertising demand and
readership demands as functions of the advertising price and the newspaper price.16
Intuitively, this means that, given a set of prices chosen by the platform, there is
only one set of quantities: the consumers coordination game, due to the fact that
optimal decisions of customers on side A depend on decisions of customers on side
R and vice versa, has a unique equilibrium.
Substituting (5) into the profit function above, one obtains
p ¼ PAQ^AðPA;PRÞ þ PRQ^RðPR;PAÞ  CðQ^AðPA;PRÞ; Q^RðPR;PAÞÞ ð6Þ
Then, the monopolist’s profit maximizing prices solve the first order conditions


























Filistrucchi and Klein (2013) show that one can obtain the derivatives of the reduced
15 In the newspaper example, consider the case of one more reader buying the (monopolist) newspaper.
This starts a loop: more readers, more advertising, fewer readers, less advertising, more readers... and so
on. Intuitively the condition above ensures that this loop converges for any set of prices. If so, when the
publisher changes one price, the resulting change in quantities is finite.
16 This result is used in Affeldt et al. (2013) to derive formulas for Upward Pricing Pressure in a two-
sided market. An equivalent condition for two-sided markets is assumed to hold in Kaiser and Wright
(2006) who bring the Hotelling model of Armstrong (2006) to the data.
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where d ¼ 1  oQAoQR oQ
R
oQA [ 0. Note that the sign of the cross-price derivatives depends
on the sign of the network effects: If the network effect is positive, the cross-price
derivative is negative, if the network effect is negative the cross-price derivative is
positive.
From the first-order conditions in (2) and (3), one can obtain the monopolist’s

























































total own-price elasticity on the advertisers’ side, gQ^
R
PR
is the total own-price elasticity






are the total cross-price elasticities.




addition to the changes in QR directly due to the change in PR; also the additional
changes in QR due to the indirect network effects. Consider the newspaper example:
Suppose that the monopolist increases the price to the readers PR while keeping the
price to the advertisers PA unchanged; as a result the quantity of readers QR




However, the decrease in the number of readers QR also decreases the quantity of
advertising sold QA (as advertisers willingness to pay for an advertising slot in a
newspaper increases with the number of readers). In turn, the decrease in advertising
sold QA increases the quantity of readers QR (if readers of newspapers are annoyed









, which measure the effects of an increase in PR on QA and of PA on QR
and on QA.
17 This is done also in Affeldt et al. (2013) to estimate the diversion ratios necessary to apply Upward
Pricing Pressure in a two-sided market.
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negative when the condition for the existence of the reduced form demand functions
is satisfied (i.e. when (4) holds). As a result, the first term on the right hand side, in
both Eqs. (10) and (11), is positive. In both cases it resembles the term on the right
hand side in the Eq. (1), but differs in that the elasticities in Eqs. (10) and (11)
include the indirect network effects.
The existence of a second term on the right hand side, in both Eqs. (10) and (11),
is also due to the presence of the indirect network effects. Its sign depends on the







respectively) and on the sign of the markup on the










). Hence, the markups on the
two-sides of the market are interrelated.






, they can be positive or










shown in Eq. (9).
Without loss of generality, let us consider the markup on side R given by



























\0. This implies that customers on side A attach a positive value to













i.e. if the total elasticity of Q^A with respect to PR is (sufficiently) larger than the total
elasticity of Q^A with respect to PA and revenues from side A are more important
then revenues from side R. In this case, it is more profitable to lower the price to
customers on side R and increase the price to customers on side A.
We have thus shown that, depending on the sign and size of the own-price effects
and the indirect network effects, it may be a short-run profit maximizing strategy for
a monopolist in a two-sided market to set a price below marginal cost on one side of
the market. In the context of our newspaper example, it may be the case that a
monopolist publisher finds it privately optimal to distribute its newspaper for free to
readers (even though there are marginal production and distribution costs) while
selling advertising space to advertisers.
18 This too is without loss of generality, because in a two-sided market customers of at least one side
must attach a positive value to customers of the other side.
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2.2 A Two-Sided Areeda–Turner Rule
Given that a monopolist might find it profit maximizing in the short-run to set a
price below marginal cost on one side of a two-sided market, setting a price below
marginal cost on one side only cannot be considered a sign of predation. Hence, as
claimed also by Evans (2003) and Wright (2004), the Areeda–Turner rule cannot be
applied to only one side of a two-sided market. One needs instead to apply the logic
of Areeda and Turner (1975) to two-sided markets.
Clearly a possibility for a two-sided Areeda–Turner rule would be to require that
both prices be below their respective marginal costs for the pricing strategy of a
dominant firm to be presumed predatory. However, this would restrict the set of
prices found to be predatory more than the Areeda–Turner rule does in one-sided
markets.
In such markets, the benchmark is a price that is equal to marginal cost. Any
lower price implies that the monopolist is making a loss at the margin, while
economic theory predicts that a profit-maximizing monopolist will make a gain at
the margin. In addition, if marginal costs are constant, any price that is lower than
marginal cost also implies that the monoplolist is making negative variable profits.
The benchmark should be the same in two-sided markets: Prices such that the
monopolist is making an overall loss at the margin should be considered predatory.
For such prices it should also be the case that, if marginal costs are constant, a
monopolist makes negative profits. Instead, if the criterion is that the price should be
below marginal cost on both sides of a two-sided market, this would consider as
non-predatory a substantial set of prices at which a monopolist is making an overall
loss at the margin: all of those prices for which the monopolist makes a marginal
gain on one side and a marginal loss on the other side but the latter overwhelms the
former.
To see this, consider the case in which the monopolist is making a loss on side R,
i.e. PR  oC
oQ^R
\0: Then, for the monopolist to make a loss overall, it is not necessary
that it also makes a loss at the margin on side A, i.e. it is not necessary that
PA  oC
oQ^A
\0. Instead it is necessary that the marginal gain on side A is not enough
to offset the marginal loss on side R. The same holds, of course, if R and A are
reversed Thus, an Areeda–Turner rule for two-sided markets, would specify that




















In other words, for a two-sided market one can reformulate the Areeda–Turner rule
as follows:
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When the sum of the prices on the two-sided market, weighted by the marginal
network effect, is lower than the sum of the corresponding marginal costs,
weighted by the marginal network effect, prices should be judged predatory.
Conditions (14) and (15) imply not only that the profit margin on one side should
be negative but also that the weighted sum of the profit margins on the two-sides
should be negative, when the appropriate network effect is taken as the weight.
Hence, a finding of negative profit margins on both sides would be sufficient to
justify a presumption of predatory pricing in the Areeda–Turner spirit, but it would
not be necessary.
In fact, there is no guarantee that the profit margin on a given side is positive,
even for a profit maximizing monopolist: From the first order conditions (7) and (8),





























These conditions show that for a profit-maximizing monopolist the weighted sum
of the profit margins in (14) and (15) would be positive. As argued above, for such a
monopolist on at least one side of the market the profit margin must be positive, but
on the other side it could be negative. Conditions (15) and (14) also ensure that
predatory prices are such that variable profits are negative if average variable costs
are constant.
Finally, recognizing not only, as did Areeda and Turner (1975), that marginal
cost data are typically unavailable, but also that estimates of the marginal network
effect are not easy to obtain, prices should be presumed predatory if
PR  AVCR þ Q
A
QR
PA  AVCA \0 ð18Þ
or, equivalently,19 if
PA  AVCA þ Q
R
QA
PR  AVCR \0 ð19Þ
Note that these conditions preserve the properties that: a) the left-hand side is
positive for a profit-maximizing monopolist; and b) if a set of prices satisfy it and
marginal costs are constant, variable profits are negative. These same properties are
preserved in a one-sided market when one uses ðP AVCÞ\0 instead of
19 Only in the special case in which one side does not affect the other, e.g. when readers do not care about
the number of ads in the newspaper, condition (19) will become
PA  AVCA \0
while condition (18) will remain unchanged. In this case, they would not be equivalent.
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ðP oQdCÞ\0.
To conclude, for most practical purposes, for a two-sided market one can
reformulate the Areeda–Turner rule as follows:
A (weighted) price level below the reasonably anticipated (weighted) average
variable cost level should be judged predatory.
3 An Application to Daily Newspapers
To illustrate the results that were derived in the previous section, we now analyse
two alleged cases of predatory pricing in the newspaper industry, which is a typical
two-sided industry. The first case—the Times-Independent price war—highlights
the importance of using the correct Areeda–Turner rule for two-sided markets rather
than the one-sided rule and concerns the quality newspaper market, where both
readers and advertisers pay to access the platform. The second—the Aberdeen
Journals case—concerns the market for free newspapers and illustrates how one
should deal with predatory allegations in those two-sided markets in which one side
of the market does not pay. In fact, that customers on one side may not pay is a
common feature of many two-sided markets, from the traditional free-to-air TV
market to many recent online services (such as Internet search, online news, free
email accounts and social networks).
3.1 The Times: Independent Price War
During the early 1990s the UK market for quality broadsheet newspapers had
experienced stable cover prices. On the 1st September 1993, The Times, The
Independent and The Guardian were priced at 45 p, and The Daily Telegraph was
priced at 48 p.
On 6 September 1993 The Times lowered its price by 33 %, from 45 to 30 p. As
its circulation revenues came under pressure, on 12 October 1993 The Independent
raised its price from 45 to 50 p. On 23 June 1994, while The Daily Telegraph matched
the new price of The Times (lowering its price by 37.5 %), The Independent was
offered on a one-day sale for 20 p, with the following announcement appearing on its
first page: ‘‘We remain dedicated to journalism of the highest quality and integrity.
Readers will understand that this can never be cheap’’. On 24 June 1994 The Times
lowered its price by another 33 %, from 30 to 20 p, bringing the overall price cut to
55 %. Finally, on 1 August 1994 The Independent was also forced to lower its price
by 40 %, from 50 to 30 p. Figure 1 depicts this price war graphically.20
The Independent claimed to be the target of a predatory attempt by the Times. It
held that the prices of 30 and 20 p per copy of The Times amounted respectively to
a ‘‘£18m a year’’ and a ‘‘£30m a year’’ subsidy. It filed a complaint with the OFT. A
‘deep pocket’ predator story was put forward, according to which NIN (which
20 Note that the graph reports average prices per month. Hence, unless the price change takes place on the
first day of the month, the changes appear in the graph a bit smoother than one would expect given the
description in the text.
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owned The Times) could afford to sustain higher losses than could The Independent,
thanks to cross-subsidization from other profitable media businesses that it owned.
The OFT investigations into the price cuts of September 1993 and June 2004 led to
the conclusion that The Times was not dominant in The readers’ market for national
daily newspapers and that The Independent was just one of its competitors. Hence
The Times could not reasonably expect that the losses that it would incur in the
‘‘predatory’’ campaign would be recouped by a higher price after The Independent
would have exited the market. As a result the OFT dismissed the claims of predation.
The price war influenced the public discussion of the adoption of the new UK
Competition Act in 1998: The House of Lords sought, without success, to introduce
an amendment to the bill that would specifically prohibit predatory prices, even in
the absence of a dominant position by the predator, in circumstances that might
reduce the diversity of the press.
As also shown in Fig. 1, from July 1995 cover prices of The Times, The Daily
Telegraph and The Independent started to rise, and from January 1996 they
stabilized again.
However in 1998, following another formal complaint by The Daily Telegraph,
The Guardian and The Independent, the OFT investigated The Times’ behavior
during the period between June 1996 and January 1998 when the Monday edition
was sold for 10 p, and concluded that such prices were predatory.21
Fig. 1 The price war
21 Since, this behavior had ended 16 months before the end of the investigation, the OFT decided not to
refer News International (publisher of The Times) to the Competition Commission for charges and
accepted assurances given by the publisher that it would notify and provide detailed justification for any
future reductions of its cover price.
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Interestingly, in all of its investigations, the OFT failed to recognize the two-
sidedness of the market and the fact that the losses from the readers’ market might
be covered by gains in the advertising market.
We draw on the data in Behringer and Filistrucchi (2011) to show that despite the
huge cut in prices, the pricing strategy of The Times in 1993 and 1994 could not be
presumed predatory according to the Areeda–Turner rule properly modified to take
into account the two-sidedness of the market, i.e. according to Eq. (18). Behringer
and Filistrucchi (2011) argue that the observed price war can be rationalized by the
boom in the advertising market, which shifted the optimal business model of
publishers towards more advertising financing.
In particular, on the readers’ side of the market, we use monthly observations of
circulation and cover prices. On the advertising side of the market we use monthly
observations on advertising quantity and revenues of The Times.22 We recover
advertising prices by dividing revenues by quantity. Our sample covers the period
1991–1997.
According to The Independent the average variable cost of the Times was
32.5 p:17.5 p went to the distribution and the cost of printing a copy was 15 p.
Since this was reported by the complainant, if anything the estimate should be
biased upward and the resulting price-cost margins should be biased towards
predation. We thus use this estimate (adjusting it by the monthly CPI) to estimate
the overall markups of the Times from 1991 to 1997 per copy sold, taking into
account both the cover price and the revenues from advertising as suggested by the
two-sided Areeda-Tuner rule in (18).23 Figure 2 shows that, although the overall per
copy markup of The Times dropped substantially during the price war, it always
remained above zero. Clearly, with a marginal cost of 32.5 p at a price of 30 p or
20 p, the price-cost margin solely on the readers’ side was negative. Applying the
Areeda–Turner rule to the readers’ side of the market only would lead to the
conclusion that prices are predatory.
However, as shown by Fig. 3, the cut in prices led to a substantial increase in
circulation. Figure 4 shows that the higher circulation led to an increase in
advertising revenues. The latter effect is taken into account by a two-sided Areeda–
Turner rule, but not by a one-sided Areeda–Turner rule. This illustrates how they
can lead to different conclusions.
3.2 The Aberdeen Journals’ Case
While the case The Times versus Independent concerned alleged predation on the
cover price in the market for national newspapers, the case of Aberdeen Journals
concerned a case of alleged predation of the advertising price in the market for local
22 Data on circulation come from those collected by the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC). Data on
prices were collected from the newspaper publishers themselves.The advertising data were acquired from
Nielsen Media Research UK.
23 Note that we consider all advertising costs to be fixed in the short-run. This assumption is in line with
the outcome of the discussion, by market participants and the OFT, of newspaper costs in the Aberdeen
Jounals’s case. The rationale is that advertising staff is fixed in the short-run and that printing one page of
content or one page of advertising has the same cost.
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newspapers. More importantly, the case of Aberdeen Journals concerned a two-
sided market where one side did not pay, but, differently from the recent Bottin
Cartographes versus Google case that we discussed in the introduction, the
Fig. 2 Two-sided and one-sided price-cost margins for The Times
Fig. 3 Cover price and circulation of The Times
Areeda–Turner in Two-Sided Markets 301
123
allegations of predation referred to pricing on the paying side. This raises additional
issues with regard to the application of the correct two-sided Areeda–Turner rule.
The case follows in time the Times-Independent price war that was discussed in
the previous section. After the introduction of the UK Competition Act on 1 March
2000, which made the abuse of a dominant position illegal, Aberdeen & District
Independent complained that Aberdeen Journals Limited was engaging in predatory
pricing of advertising space in its free newspaper Herald & Post.
On 16 July 2001, and again on 29 September 2002,24 the OFT issued its decision
against the Aberdeen Journals, which was owned by Northcliffe Newspapers Group
Ltd. The OFT found that Aberdeen Journals was dominant in the market for the
supply of advertising space in local newspapers (paid-for and free) within the
Aberdeen area. The OFT also concluded that Aberdeen Journals had engaged in
predation against its only rival in the relevant market, the Aberdeen & District
Independent: it deliberately incurred losses on its free newspaper, the Herald &
Post, by pricing advertising space at below average variable cost in an attempt to
exclude the Aberdeen & District Independent. According to the OFT, predatory
pricing started in response to the launch of the Aberdeen & District Independent in
1996 and continued until 29 March 2000, 4 weeks after the Competition Act came
into force.
Fig. 4 Circulation and advertising revenues of The Times
24 The OFT decision of 16 July 2001 was appealed to the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal
(CCAT), which set it aside on the basis that the market definition on which the decision had been made
was inadequate. The OFT issued a new decision on 29 September 2002 confirming the original
findings.The decision covers a period of infringement from the introduction of the Competition Act on 1
March 2000, which makes the abuse of a dominant position illegal, to 29 March 2000.
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In order to assess predation, the OFT conducted an empirical analysis that was
aimed at establishing whether advertising revenues were higher than average
variable costs.25 While the Herald & Post did not incur losses prior to the entry of
the Independent, it started to make losses in March 1996 after it heavily decreased
advertising rates, increased pagination and increased circulation.
The average advertising rate was cut drastically shortly after the launch of the
Aberdeen & District Independent in April 2006. It was significantly cut again in
October 1998 and the price remained below that level until July 1999. A significant
rise took place only in April 2000. Also, the pagination, i.e. the number of pages per
month, of the Herald & Post was significantly increased following the launch of the
Independent from under 100 pages per month in the period October 1995 to April
1996 to 148 pages in May 1996 and peaking between September 1998 and October
1999 when it was in the range of 350 to 480 pages a month. Lastly, the distribution
of the Herald & Post substantially increased after the entry of the Independent from
below 100,000 to as much as 126,000 in 1999.
Importantly, the OFT always took into account the costs that were necessary to
serve the readers even if readers did not pay for the product.The OFT noted that
whether costs are fixed or variable depends also on the time frame. In particular, it
carried out its analysis with reference to both a shorter time frame (the month) and a
longer time frame (the alleged predation period). Clearly, considering a larger time
frame implies considering more costs as variable and makes a finding of predation
more likely. When taking the longer time horizon, the OFT included among variable
costs the costs of printing, distribution, editorial staff (i.e. costs on the readers side)
and advertising staff (i.e. costs on the advertising side). It thus estimated that The
Herald & Post was selling below average variable costs at least through March
2000. Furthermore, treating editorial staff and the advertising team as fixed and the
cost of printing and distribution (i.e. only costs on the readers side) as variable, the
OFT estimated that the Herald & Post’s revenues exceeded variable costs only on
five occasions between July 1996 and March 2000.
Without access to the data, which were marked as confidential and thus not
reported, we cannot check whether indeed the price that was charged by Aberdeen
Journals was predatory. However, even without access to the data, based on the
theoretical results in Sect. 2, we can claim that the OFT applied the correct two-
sided Areeda-Tuner rule when it took into account average variable costs related to
both sides of the market. In fact, even if on one-side of the market the platform gives
away the product for free, as it is the case with free newspapers, then one still needs
to apply the two-sided Areeda–Turner rule given by Eq. (18). However, since on the
readers’ side of the market the newspaper was given away for free, Eq. (18) reduces
to PA  AVCA  QR
QA
AVCR\0 when the OFT takes as a reference the longer time
frame and to PA  QR
QA
AVCR\0 when it chooses the shorter time horizon.26
25 Internal memoranda also showed that the conduct was intentional and that the Herald & Post was
subsidized by its parent company Northcliffe Newspapers Group Ltd in order to drive the Aberdeen &
District Independent out of the market.
26 This is because, according to the OFT, in the shorter time frame all advertising costs were fixed (as
they were mostly related to advertising staff).
Areeda–Turner in Two-Sided Markets 303
123
In other words, although one side of the market does not pay for the product it
receives (e.g. here readers do not pay for a copy of the newspaper), still the average
variable costs to serve that side of the market need to be taken into account to assess
predation.27 Otherwise, one would run the risk of not sanctioning platforms that
charge predatory prices consistent with the logic of Areeda and Turner (1975).
4 Conclusion
In their seminal paper, Areeda and Turner (1975) argued that a price below marginal
cost should be considered a sign of predation. Recognizing that marginal cost data
were typically unavailable, the authors suggested to presume as unlawful a price
that is below average variable cost. This Areeda–Turner rule has become the
conceptual reference to assess claims of predation. Different authors have
highlighted possible short-comings of the rule, while different jurisdictions have
adopted different variants of it. A recent survey on predatory pricing is found in
Elzinga and Mills (2015).
In our paper, we abstracted from the debate on the limits and merits of the
Areeda–Turner rule. We simply recognise its importance in the assessment of
predatory pricing and focus instead on the extension of the rule to two-sided
markets.
We first showed that a monopolist’s price-cost margins in a two-sided market are
interrelated. Furthermore, for a two-sided monopolist, even in the absence of actual
or potential competition, it may be profit-maximizing to charge a price below
marginal cost on one side of the market. As a result, the Areeda–Turner rule that the
price is below average variable cost or marginal cost on one side of the market
cannot be considered as a sign of predation in two-sided markets.
We then followed the Areeda–Turner logic to derive a corresponding rule for
two-sided markets. We argued that one should apply the rule by taking into account
revenues and costs from both sides of the market. Hence, in a two-sided market the
rule should be rephrased as requiring that the weighted average of the prices, with
the weights given by the marginal network effect, is below the weighted average of
the marginal costs. As in a one-sided market, given the difficulty to measure
marginal costs, for most practical purposes, courts should presume as unlawful a
(weighted) price level that is below the (weighted) average variable cost level. The
only partial exception to this rule is the particular case in which one of the two sides
of the market is indifferent to the other side. In that case, to assess the predatory
nature of prices on the side that exerts no externality on the other, a one-sided
Areeda–Turner rule can be applied.
As applications, we analysed two alleged cases of predatory behaviour in the
market for daily newspapers. The first case, the Times-Independent price war,
concerns a two-sided market where customers on both sides pay for the product or
27 Recognizing that free newspapers also (bear a cost to) serve readers should imply the necessity of a
definition of a relevant market on the readers’ side. Interestingly, as shown in Filistrucchi et al. (2014),
competition authorities generally fail to define a second relevant market on the side where the product is
given away for free. The OFT in Aberdeen Journals is no exception.
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service that they receive. The Independent claimed that the cover prices of The
Times were predatory because they were lower than the average variable cost of a
copy of the newspaper. We showed that if one took into account the revenues from
advertising, as suggested by a two-sided Areeda–Turner rule, the prices could not be
presumed predatory. The Aberdeen Journals case illustrates how one should deal
with those two-sided markets in which one side of the market does not pay, as the
case concerned predation by a free daily newspaper. Correctly, the OFT took into
account costs from both sides of the market (in addition to the price of advertising)
when calculating profit margins.
Overall, the discussion of these cases highlights the importance of using the
correct Areeda–Turner rule for two-sided markets rather than the traditional one-
sided rule.
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